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Introduction 
 
About this work 
In the era of globalization, projects of urban poverty alleviation and city transformation 
are closely connected to demographic change, political objectives and capitalistic 
economic policies. Worldwide, states have seen urbanization rates increase to 
unprecedented levels (Beier and Strava 2020: 1). This has entailed the proliferation of 
different types of informal housing especially in developing countries, such as slums, 
which have become a major challenge for urban planning and poverty alleviation 
strategies. Such is the case that the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations 
specifically recognizes the need to improve the living conditions of slum-dwellers 
(OHCHR 2000).  
In Morocco, King Mohammed VI launched the Cities Without Slums programme (Villes 
Sans Bidonvilles- VSB in French) in 2004, a national initiative officially aimed at 
addressing pressing issues of urban poverty, unsanitary housing and social 
marginalization by eradicating slums in the country. Thus, big areas such as Casablanca 
—the focus of this work— have witnessed the acceleration of resettlement and rehousing 
strategies, that had been used since colonial times (Navez-Bouchanine 2003a, Bogaert 
2018).  
With the implementation of the programme, the debate soon arose on whether it would 
deliver the expected outcomes. On the one hand, UN-Habitat rewarded Morocco with the 
UN-Habitat Scroll of Honour Award in 2010 and applauded the North African country 
for having “one of the world’s most successful and comprehensive slum reduction and 
improvement programmes” (Bogaert 2018: 212). On the other hand, the programme has 
4 
 
received ample criticism from the academic community. It has been blamed for the 
displacement of slum populations, the creation of exploitative class relations (Zemni and 
Bogaert 2011: 414), the redeployment of state power through the creation of “new state 
spaces” (Bergh 2012: 412, Berriane 2010: 107) and the augmentation of gentrification1.  
My work stands for the second view, and pays special attention to the element of 
displacement. Specifically, I examine whether the geographies of urban population 
displacement and poverty concentration in Casablanca have changed due to slum 
eradication since the implementation of the VSB programme, and if so, how. Moreover, 
I explore the different political and socioeconomic consequences of this displacement for 
slum-dwellers. 
My contribution to the field is an exhaustive search of displacement patterns throughout 
the Casablanca prefecture and the creation of a dichotomy of soft vs. hard displacement, 
which differentiates extents of displacement in the region. Studying urban dynamics is 
relevant because they have implications for the broader socioeconomic landscape, with 
big cities accounting for most of the national economic growth. In Morocco, “three 
quarters of the national GDP is generated within the urban economy” (Bogaert 2012: 
259). The understanding of the different political and socioeconomic consequences of the 
VSB, the second part of this work, provides leaders with an opportunity to improve the 
quality of life in urban areas, especially the conditions of the more vulnerable. Hence, I 
hope to identify relevant lessons learnt from the Moroccan experience that allow for a 
less slum-dweller discriminatory housing policy in the future.  
 
                                                          
1 Gentrification is defined here as the process of renovation of a city so that it conforms to middle-
class taste. This is usually done at the expense of vulnerable populations.  
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Methodology 
The theoretical framework that guides the research is a combination of Henri Lefebvre’s 
theory of the production of space and a critique to neoliberalism. “Neoliberalism is a 
contested concept and its variable implementation around the world has produced highly 
differentiated outcomes” (Davis 2006: 89). In this work, it is understood as the reforms 
of liberalization, privatization and deregulation that the Moroccan economy has 
experienced since the early 1980s, and which have integrated urban spaces into the world 
market (Bogaert 2012: 255). The starting point is that neoliberalism is a highly political 
as well as an economic project, one that has worsened inequality and poverty rates while 
at the same time expanded certain aspects of state power in Morocco (Hanieh 2013: 73, 
Davis 2006: 101).  
In this context, Lefebvre’s work is a suitable instrument to study the connections between 
Morocco’s urban planning strategies and its political economy. Lefebvre’s (1991) main 
proposition is that space is not a passive locus of social relations, but a social product and 
a tool for the analysis of society. He argues that spatial organization is always political, 
with social and political forces using spatial strategies to reorganize socio-spatial 
relations. In a political-economic sense, these strategies are used by the state to promote 
different spaces as sites for the accumulation of capital (Brenner and Elden 2009: 369). 
Utilising this theory allows me to give space a special place, in my attempt to better 
understand the rationale behind the VSB programme and its effects on the Casablanca 
slum population.  
In order to answer the research questions, this work analyses the prefecture of Casablanca 
and VSB-related press articles and official policy documents published by different 
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Moroccan state departments2. The press articles were extracted from the digital archives 
of different newspapers using the keywords “bidonville”, “VSB” and “Casablanca” from 
2004 to present day3. In total, the research comprises 200 press articles and 10 policy 
documents. This includes pieces about the different prefectures of arrondissement that 
comprise Casablanca and the provinces next to it4.   
The newspapers under analysis are Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, Al Bayane, L’Économiste, 
Libération, Le Matin, La Nouvelle Tribune, La Vie Éco and TelQuel. It is important to 
note that these have different political inclinations and affiliations5. On the one hand, Le 
Matin and L’Économiste are clear pro-regime publications, whereas TelQuel, Al Bayane 
and Libération are more critical towards the monarchy and governmental policies. In this 
spectrum, Aujourd’hui Le Maroc, La Nouvelle Tribune and La Vie Éco stand somewhat 
in the middle (Media Ownership Monitor n.d). The articles under analysis were randomly 
selected using the keywords mentioned above. Because some newspapers published far 
more information about the Cities Without Slums programme in Casablanca than others, 
the amount of articles cited in this work is unbalanced, with the majority of them 
belonging to Le Matin and L’Économiste, pro-regime publications. The purpose of this 
work is not to analyse media discourses, but to extract objective information about the 
changing locations of slum-dwellers and then to analyse the different effects of population 
displacement. This imbalance is a limitation especially for the second part of the research, 
                                                          
2 With the exception of one report, which was published by the World Bank.  
3 This is the time period covered in the research because the VSB programme was launched in 
2004 and it is still going on.  
4 The Casablanca prefecture comprises eight prefecture of arrondissements: Ain Chock, Hay 
Hassani, Casablanca Anfa, Al Fida Mers Sultan, Ben M’Sick, Moulay Rachid, Sidi Bernoussi and 
Ain-Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi. Médiouna and Nouaceur are the provinces adjacent to Casablanca. 
5 In Morocco, media history was characterised by a highly centralized and factional press during 
the protectorate years, and transformed into a state-dominated media after independence. Over 
the years, increasing openness has paved the way for the increasing presence of an independent 
media, although freedom of press is still something to be achieved (Iddins 2015: 289). Morocco 
is thus an example of the general trend of media ambiguity seeing in the MENA region, playing 
a role as both a tool of repression and a tool of democratic openness (Khondker 2011: 676).  
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mainly subjective. I am fully aware of this, and for that reason, whenever possible, I have 
contrasted the information with other media sources or secondary literature and I have 
avoided taking the information at face value. At all times, the objective has been to present 
an accurate picture of the housing situation in Casablanca.  
The consulted newspapers are all French-language newspapers published in Morocco. By 
the same token, all policy documents are written in French. Here it is important to 
acknowledge that there are certain limitations of not analysing any sources written in 
Arabic, especially as regards the chapter about the ambiguous effects of displacement. In 
spite of everything, French is still a very relevant language in Morocco, with a very ample 
variety of sources to consult. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that a valuable 
contribution can still be made by analysing texts in this language. 
Although, ideally, this work would have had a strong basis of fieldwork research, I argue 
that text analysis, especially the media sources analysis, is a valuable method that can lay 
the foundations of a good work. Many press articles, with their different political views 
and opinions, included interviews with and testimonies of former slum-dwellers 
implicated in the VSB. These testimonies included both positive and negative aspects of 
the VSB. Thus, the analysis of press articles allows for the expression and analysis of 
first-hand information that would not have been possible to obtain otherwise. Whenever 
possible, this information has been contrasted not only with other media sources, but also 
with secondary literature information obtained from fieldwork research by various 
scholars. I believe this combination of texts analysis helps reduce the bias in unbalanced 
political information and therefore makes a useful research tool. Again, as different actors 
publish information with different purposes in mind and targeting specific readers 
(Bryman 2012), the information in this work has always been considered as part of a 
broader context.  
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An introduction to slums: places of stigmatisation and urban poverty.  
Slums, also called shantytowns, are a type of informal housing characterised by weak 
structures, unsanitary conditions, lack of access to basic services such as water, electricity 
or sewage and the illegal occupancy of land.  
This topic has attracted a great deal of attention in the academic community. 
Traditionally, the expertise on slums has been most present in Latin America and South 
Asia, with different authors studying the main approaches to informal housing from 
colonial times to present day. For instance, Angotti (2013: 7, 11) argues that urban 
inequalities in Latin America are not only a by-product of the colonial legacy and an 
unequal economic system, but also the result of conscious decisions made by policy-
makers, who have turned a blind eye on, and even contributed to, the uneven development 
and fragmentation of cities and metropolitan regions. This has reinforced the formal-
informal city divide and the slum has always turned out to be the problem, “considered 
as shameful and unhealthy, not only for its inhabitants but for the rest of the city and the 
country” (Milbert 2006: 302). Thus, different strategies of slum upgrading and 
eradication have been justified by the needs of modernity and beautification of the city. 
In India, projects of slum removal are only authorised if considered to be “in the larger 
public interest”. This shows the aspirations of many cities in the developing world to 
become “world-class” cities (Dupont 2008: 79). The main problem with these strategies, 
Bolay (2006: 285) argues, is that they fail to address the root problems; “they do not 
question the urban and economic model that generates the slum in the first place”.  
This trendsetting work on slum theory has paved the way for further work in other regions 
of the world. In the Middle East and North Africa, there is a growing literature that seeks 
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to abandon the myth of regional exceptionalism, and different authors have made valuable 
contributions in the field of slum eradication. Morocco is a case in point.  
Again, one main issue of uneven development is that it “generates cities increasingly 
made up of homogeneous micro-spaces” (Milbert 2006: 300). Milbert alerts about the 
risk that “urban societies may lose their internal cohesion”. In Morocco, there is already 
some sign of this: Belarbi (2015: 141, 142) differentiates between external and internal 
perceptions, which point to external and internal rejections respectively: externally, the 
centre rejects the periphery, and internally, old slums are better tolerated at the expense 
of more recent slums, which are more easily rejected. This is supported by Navez-
Bouchanine (2003b: 7), who argues that old slums were relatively peripheral at the time 
of their creation, but became part of the city centres as urban centres kept growing over 
time. On the other hand, peripheral newer slums have enjoyed a lower degree of 
integration.  
Big cities such as Casablanca have witnessed three main reintegration strategies used 
since colonial times, namely slum upgrading, rehousing and resettlement (Bogaert 2018: 
213). Although some scholars of the developing world have supported slum upgrading6, 
it has been the least used strategy in Morocco in the last decades. Rehousing and 
resettlement, on the other hand, have been widely criticized because they involve 
displacement, which puts a growing pressure on slum populations, who feel increasingly 
marginalized vis-à-vis formal housing inhabitants (Bogaert 2018: 209). This is the case 
because housing is not only a shelter, but “an essential element within people’s practices 
of home-making”, as pointed out by Beier and Strava (2020: 9). This means that, when 
                                                          
6 For instance, based upon his study of urban Latin America, John F.C. Turner argued that “if 
governments improved the slum environment by getting rid of unsanitary human wastes, polluted 
water, etc. most slum dwellers would gradually better their homes and contribute to the upgrading 
of the neighbourhoods” (in Werlin 1999: 1523, 1524). 
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displacement takes place, the affected communities suffer from limited spatial and social 
integration in a new environment, complicated access to the workplace and increasing 
transportation costs, among others.  
As in the case of India illustrated above, these developments show the aspirations of the 
Moroccan government and its major objective of transforming Casablanca in particular, 
and the country in general, into a modern hub for finance, international investments and 
tourism. However, as this work shows in the following chapters, this is happening at the 
sacrifice of the more vulnerable.  
The study unfolds in the following manner: chapter 1 delves into Morocco’s historical 
context in the field of urban planning and the country’s political economy. Chapter 2 
maps the changing geographies of displacement in Casablanca since the launch of the 
VSB until present day. Chapter 3 analyses the ambiguous political and socioeconomic 
effects that the programme has had for the affected slum dwellers. Finally, the study 
closes with the main conclusions from the research. 
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Chapter 1- From colonialism to neoliberalism: who decides urban planning in 
Morocco? 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the history of Morocco’s urban planning and 
political economy. It argues that the different patterns of urbanization that have shaped 
the country over the years were always part of a larger political and economic project, 
with both domestic and international actors who sought to fulfil their personal interests 
involved. 
 
Morocco before independence: a laboratory of urban planning.  
Morocco’s contact with colonial powers started before the establishment of the 
protectorate. With the French occupation of Algeria in the 1830s, France and other 
colonial powers started increasing their trading activities with Morocco (Abu-Lughod 
1980: 89). This shifted economic activity towards the coasts, which favoured originally 
irrelevant coastal cities such as Casablanca. By the mid-19th century, the metropole had 
become the hub for industry and trade in Morocco.  
The official establishment of the protectorate in 1912 paved the way for the urban 
experiments that the French conducted throughout the occupation years. As Rabinow 
(1989: 32) argues, colonial Morocco constituted a laboratory of urban planning for the 
French authorities. Although the French maintained a relationship with the Makhzen, in 
practice real power resided in the colonial government. The latter developed a spatial 
discourse based on the idea of duality. This discourse took different shapes depending on 
the governmental strategy used. On the one hand, the idea that Morocco had a dual nature, 
with territories of submission to the state —bilâd al-makhzan— and territories of 
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dissidence —bilâd al-sîba— (Sebti 2013: 42) was used to justify military occupation and 
destruction of dissident tribes. On the other hand, the idea of dual city was used to separate 
the villes nouvelles7 built for Europeans from the ancienne médina inhabited by 
Moroccans, and was used in the context of “peaceful penetration” to justify the protection 
the protectorate granted to the soundness of Moroccan culture (Abu-Lughod 1980: 150).  
In practice, this meant a minimal alteration of Moroccan quarters, the creation of a cordon 
sanitaire8 around these and the construction of a modern city aimed for Europeans 
adjacent but separate from the medina. In order for the development of the villes nouvelles 
to take place, land was brought under the French property system. For instance, property 
expropriation was acceptable if justified as necessary for the public interest (Rabinow 
1989: 35). Moreover, European quarters received most of the funds for construction and 
infrastructure upgrading. In order words, there was a disproportionate allocation of public 
resources (Abu-Lughod 1980: 162, Rabinow 1989: 41).  
This resulted in a reorganized urban hierarchy in the country, with increasing social 
exclusion and uneven economic development between European and Moroccan quarters. 
This urban reorganization and uneven development would determine the direction of 
things after independence. Land expropriation in the economically useful parts of the 
country (le Maroc utile), population growth and increasing migration9 all converged and 
contributed to the increasing territorial “stress” that big coastal cities had been 
experiencing since the second half of the 19th century (Sebti 2013: 40). Casablanca 
                                                          
7 They were also called villes européennes.  
8 In this context, a cordon sanitaire is a barrier placed in a specific location in order to restrict the 
movement of people across the two sides of the barrier.   
9 Migration during the protectorate years was both internal and international. Useful spaces of 
colonial agriculture suffered from dispossessions, which increased unemployment in the 
countryside. This came together with demographic growth, stimulating rural-urban migration 
(Sebti 2013: 50). On the other hand, international migration to Moroccan cities increased 
“particularly since 1880, when foreigners were given the right to buy land and register their titles 
in Morocco” (Abu-Lughod 1980: 105-106).  
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witnessed an explosion of European migration: by 1914, “two-thirds of the Europeans in 
Morocco were in Casablanca” (Rabinow 1989: 36), and by 1936, it was the largest city 
in the country (Abu-Lughod 1980: 152). Quite often, rural migrants “would initially settle 
in peripheral slums, with the idea of finding more stable housing in the future” (Cohen 
and Eleb 2004).  
Speculation added to the territorial stress. When foreign investors increased land prices 
and built comparatively little (Rabinow 1989: 38), those who could not afford housing 
were pushed outside the centre, which resulted in a spatial extension of the city towards 
the periphery. As more families saw their lifestyle disrupted by the housing crisis, they 
had no other means but to settle where they could and construct crude shelters. This is 
what Maghraoui (2013: 72) has called “soft urbanism”. Hence, different forms of 
informal housing proliferated and Casablanca became the city with the largest slums 
(Abu-Lughod 1980: 225). This expulsion of vulnerable populations to the outskirts and 
the consequent proliferation of informal housing is the origin of Casablanca’s current 
problem with slums.  
From the 1930s, strategies of slum upgrading and eradication stated gaining prominence. 
When relocation was not possible due to housing shortage, the colonial authorities 
proposed a partial upgrading of slums so they could be acceptable as temporary housing 
(Cohen and Eleb 2004). Sometimes, slums were tolerated because they were seen as a 
means to the rural migrants’ acculturation. Thus, the institutional attitude and public 
policy towards slums was quite ambiguous already in the colonial period: “they were 
considered a direct violation of urban norms, but at the same time tolerated as temporary 
settlement in order to preserve social peace” (Zaki 2008: 116).  
These developments shed light on the question about who was the real target of the French 
urban policy. Urban planning is supposed to contemplate all sectors of a society and 
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provide them with the basic infrastructure (Studer 2015: 12). However, in colonial 
Morocco this was only the case in the European quarters.  
 
Morocco after independence: rural to urban migration and neoliberal reform. 
Internal migration and state developmentalism in the 1960s and 1970s.  
When Morocco gained independence in 1956, it faced several major challenges, the main 
ones being “the reorientation of the economy away from the colonial structure, the 
survival to the flight of French capital that came along with the exodus of Europeans and 
the development of agricultural and industrial systems that were able to cope with 
population growth” (Abu-Lughod 1980: 241). The agricultural system occupied a special 
place in the post-independence structuring of the country. Instead of developing the 
neglected non-irrigated sector, King Hassan II decided to continue with the policy of 
“developing land for the production of export crops” (Davis 2006: 90). This was done 
through a new Moroccan elite, comprised by the landlords who bought the arable land 
that was left available with the departure of the Europeans (Abu Lughod 1980: 242). 
Given that agricultural land was again in the hands of a few, rural to urban migration 
continued in the years after independence.  
The support the new rural class gave to the state was essential for the prioritization of 
agricultural development. In turn, the urban industries were ignored. An urban nationalist 
movement had been growing and gaining importance since the protectorate years, and as 
migration towards cities continued, their political weight increased. Thus, the royal 
interest in the agricultural sector and the will to limit the political power of urban spaces 
led the state to largely ignore both the planning and industrialization of urban 
concentrations (Bogaert 2012: 258). This meant that informal housing settlements such 
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as slums were ignored too (Beier and Strava 2020: 7). Since construction was de-
emphasized and slums were not being cleared, efforts at this time were aimed at upgrading 
facilities (Abu-Lughod 1980: 255).  
Although Morocco never adopted a strict socialist ideology, the 1970s saw the 
incorporation of specific characteristics of a state developmentalist model, such as the 
expansion of the public sector and increasing redistributive policies. According to Davis 
(2006: 90), in the first years of the decade the state increased public spending “by several 
hundred percent”. There were several reasons for this: first, the redistributive measures 
were an attempt to prevent another repetition of the attempted coups d’état against the 
King of 1971 and 1972. Second, the government had made high profits from phosphate 
production and opted to redistribute them. Third, these public resources were meant to 
create a “modern middle class, believed to represent a more resolute factor of 
modernization” (Cohen 2003: 174). However, these had a weak effect on the lower 
classes, such as informal housing populations.  
The high rates of public spending, along with increasing population growth and additional 
governmental costs damaged the country’s economic condition. Eventually, international 
financial institutions (IFIs) called for the implementation of austerity measures, which 
prompted the explosion of the so-called bread riots in Casablanca in 1981 (Bogaert 2018: 
7), a series of urban mass protests that took place in different Moroccan cities in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. The year 1981 marked the beginning of a new political and economic 
period. It was the time when the first significant change in the government’s approach to 
slums took place. It would no longer remain ignorant towards slum-dwellers. On the 
contrary, soon after the riots, the government started increasing repression, and upgrading 
strategies were exchanged for operations of slum eradication (Beier and Strava 2020: 8). 
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From then on, “urban planning was to be oriented towards the expansion of territorial 
control” (Bogaert 2011: 713). 
 
The neoliberal reform and the Structural Adjustment Programme of the 1980s 
In 1983, Morocco adopted a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) sponsored by the 
IMF and the World Bank10. According to the IFIs, the country needed to speed up 
economic growth or otherwise it would confront massive rates of unemployment and the 
proliferation of slums, among others (Hanieh 2013: 48). In order to achieve such 
economic growth, a package of reforms had to be implemented, with policies of 
privatization, deregulation and liberalization being the main ones. Their implementation 
started in the 1980s, and accelerated throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
The main premises were the following: by selling public assets and companies to private 
investors, the indebted public administration would earn some money and at the same 
time the new privatized firms would slowly become integrated into the global competitive 
economy (Pfeifer 1999: 23-24). In order to make the sale more attractive, the 
administration was allowed to deregulate the labour market and worsen working 
conditions (Hanieh 2013: 52). Finally, Morocco liberalized the national economy by 
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) and signing different trading agreements 
with the European Union and the United States. 
                                                          
10 Morocco was not the only country in the region to experience such a reform. Actually, the 
adoption of SAPs was a widespread phenomenon throughout the Middle East and North Africa 
region in the 1980s and 1990s. For more information on this regional pattern see Hanieh (2013: 
47-73).  
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Morocco followed the SAP instructions closely11, and for that reason it was applauded in 
international publications as “one of the IMF’s success stories” (Pfeifer 1999: 23). The 
results of the reform were at best ambiguous. According to Davis (2006: 91), on the one 
hand, GDP per capita, life expectancy and infant mortality rates improved. On the other 
hand, poverty and inequality rates worsened. By the late 1990s, around 10% of the 
Moroccan population lived in slums. This means that poorer populations such as slum-
dwellers were hit hard. 
It was at the urban level that these changes were more noticeable. As mentioned before, 
from the 1980s, strategies of slum upgrading were exchanged for strategies of slum 
eradication. This was done through the creation of different agencies aimed at intensifying 
control over urban planning. One of these agencies, the Agence Nationale pour l’Habitat 
Insalubre (ANHI) had the task to carry out and monitor the eradication of slums. The 
problem with the slum eradication policies, and the reason they failed, lies in the 
neoliberal reform itself. Slum eradication entailed the displacement and relocation of the 
evicted populations, but since the state had made huge sales and privatized the economy, 
it no longer had the necessary means to provide these populations with alternative public 
housing programmes. Moreover, the liberalization of the economy entailed the 
liberalization of the housing market, which made it easier for private investors to 
speculate on land, which in turn pushed housing prices up (Bogaert 2011: 720). The result 
was the failure of the different agencies to conduct the relocation operations that had been 
planned in the 1980s.  
Hence, the main fiasco of the neoliberal reform in Morocco as regards urban poverty is 
that it failed to address the root causes of poverty and inequality, and thus it exacerbated 
                                                          
11 Actually, Morocco made the second largest profits from privatization in the region, only after 
Egypt (Hanieh 2013: 50).  
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uneven development, to the detriment of the more vulnerable populations. This is what 
we see today in Casablanca, and what the Cities Without Slums programme is trying to 
hide. Nevertheless, not everyone was worse off with the reform. The King and his 
political and economic supporters were the main beneficiaries, those who accumulated 
the wealth generated with the reform. Davis (2006: 101) argues that this helped 
consolidate certain aspects of state power, while Bogaert (2012: 256) refers to the 
phenomenon as “new state space formation at the urban scale”. In practice, this entailed 
both a speeding up in the urbanisation of capital and an increasing involvement of the 
state in urban restructuring. This was the case because, in the new context of integration 
into the world economy, Morocco must compete to attract foreign investments to the 
country. Since “cities are the places through which the global economy is coordinated 
and where surplus value is realised and accumulated” (Bogaert 2012: 259), they started 
to be intensively redesigned in order to place themselves in the global market (Zemni and 
Bogaert 2011: 406). 
This way, urban planning has become, especially since the accession of King Mohammed 
VI to the throne in 1999, an essential element in the organization of economic and 
political life. Different authors have put an emphasis on the strategic nature of urban 
planning, both in political and economic terms. For instance, Aljem and Strava (2020: 
16) have referred to it as “a branding strategy”. Similarly, Beier (2019a: 30) has argued 
that urban planning should be understood as a governmental project that has as an 
objective the refreshing of the Moroccan state’s image as regards both foreign tourists, 
investors and its domestic population. Thus, in the last decades, urban planning has 
focused, on the one hand, on luxurious megaprojects (Aljem and Strava 2020: 12), and 
on operations of unsanitary housing and slum eradication, on the other. 
 
19 
 
The Cities Without Slums programme 
In 2001, King Mohammed VI gave an important speech in which he called for the 
“elaboration of a regulatory framework and a national programme aiming to eradicate the 
existing unsanitary housing” (Navez-Bouchanine 2008: 367). This speech proved his 
commitment to the eradication of slums at the national scale. As regards Casablanca, this 
moment pointed to its “urban malfunction and socioeconomic crisis” (ONDH 2015: 48). 
The final trigger for a comprehensive response to the issue of urban slums came with the 
Casablanca suicide bombings of 2003, whose perpetrators were slum-dwellers from the 
metropole’s shacks (Bogaert 2018: 208).  
Thus, the King launched the Cities Without Slums programme in 2004, with the strategic 
objective of eliminating all urban slums in the country. It involves a total of 85 cities 
spread all over the national territory (Ministre de l’Aménagement du Territoire National, 
de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville n.d.). The programme is 
different from previous slum policy mainly in that the state is now more involved in 
relocation operations. This is done through a strengthened cooperation with the private 
sector and the signing of an increasing number of public-private partnerships (Bogaert 
2018: 208). 
Although the programme was supposed to finish in 2010, it is still in its implementation 
phase (Bogaert 2018: 212). At the time of writing, 59 cities have been declared “cities 
without slums” in Morocco, which has meant the displacement of 277,583 households 
(Ministre de l’Aménagement du Territoire National, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de la 
Politique de la Ville n.d.). The percentage of slums in the country has decreased from 
8.2% to 4.5% between 2004 and 2014 (CREADH 2018: 27). Of the 25 billion dirhams 
that the programme is estimated to cost, 10 billion dirhams have been generated thanks 
to a tax to cement and provided by the state (Bogaert 2018: 212). The money is kept and 
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administered by the Fonds Solidarité Habitat et Intégration Urbaine (ONDH 2015: 28). 
Moreover, different international institutions such as the European Investment Bank and 
the World Bank have donated to the programme (Bogaert 2018: 212). The remaining has 
to be paid by slum-dwellers themselves. 
 
What are the different operations implemented under the VSB? 
The VSB programme can be briefly summarised into three different types of operations, 
those of upgrading, resettlement and rehousing. These are well-known strategies for the 
Moroccan state. Slum upgrading refers to the restructuration that a slum goes through in 
order to see its facilities upgraded. The infrastructure is improved through the provision 
of electricity, potable water, sewage… The implementation of this strategy is more likely 
to take place in old slums located in the city-centres (Banque Mondiale 2006: 30). 
However, this strategy was practically abandoned in the 1980s and the two predominant 
options during the implementation of the VSB have been resettlement and rehousing 
(Bogaert 2018: 213). 
Resettlement entails the allocation of land plots in order for slum families to build over 
their homes. According to this strategy, it is possible to build more than one apartment in 
the same land plot, so families can share some costs (Ministre de l’Aménagement du 
Territoire National, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville n.d.). These 
families can make an agreement with a third party, usually a real estate developer, through 
which the third party builds the house and bears the costs of the construction. In exchange, 
the two families get an apartment each and the real estate developer gets the other one or 
two floors. This is called the “third party partner” or R+3 strategy, and it is a way for poor 
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families to get free housing while the real estate developer gets preferential access to a 
public plot of land (Bogaert 2018: 220). 
Lastly, rehousing refers to the transfer of slum-dwellers to cheap social housing 
apartments. It is usually applied to slums that are located in densely populated areas that 
the state wishes to clear for city restructuring purposes (Ministre de l’Aménagement du 
Territoire National, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville n.d.). This 
tends to be real estate developers’ preferred option (Banque Mondiale 2006: 36-37).  
 
Who are the main actors involved in the programme? 
The VSB programme has seen the participation of an array of both public and private 
actors, often working in cooperation. This cooperation has been referred to as “territorial 
governance” at the local level (CREADH 2018: 50), and makes reference to the question 
of who makes the decisions in the framework of the VSB. 
The most important public actor is the state, represented by the King, the Ministry of 
Housing and the Ministry of Interior (Banque Mondiale 2006: 24, 25). The King has 
played an active role in promoting the relevance of tackling the issue of unsanitary 
housing and the VSB since 2001 and 2004, respectively. In line with this commitment, 
the Ministry of Housing has gained relevance since the beginning of the 21st century. It 
supervises Holding Al Omrane, a public entity created from the fusion of the Agence 
Nationale pour l’Habitat Insalubre with other public housing agencies. A clear sign of 
its importance is the fact that it is in charge of “more than 80% of the operations developed 
within the VSB” (Bogaert 2018: 214). In addition to Al Omrane, the Ministry of Housing 
comprises the so-called Directions Régionales de l’Habitat, regional departments that 
work hand in hand with the public agencies and develop city contracts to make sure that 
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the different actors involved in VSB operations fulfil their obligations (Banque Mondiale 
2006: 24).  
Then, the Ministry of Interior has the task to supervise the implementation of the 
programme and coordinate the different actors operating on the ground. The case of 
Casablanca is interesting here because it shows the existing tensions between ministries. 
Unlike other cities, Casablanca has not signed a city contract because that would put it 
under the control of the Ministry of Housing. Given the metropole’s strategic and 
financial importance, it has been placed under the control of the Ministry of Interior, 
represented at the local level by the wali of Casablanca. Thus, a new public agency called 
Idmaj Sakan has been created to coordinate VSB operations in the city, pushing Al 
Omrane into the background (Bogaert 2018: 216).  
For their part, the main private actors are real estate developers, banks and microcredit 
organizations and, of course, slum-dwellers themselves. Real estate developers act in 
cooperation with Al Omrane (or Idmaj Sakan, in the case of Casablanca) through public-
private partnerships in order to provide slum-dwellers with formal social housing. They 
are usually in charge of building cheap apartment blocks destined to the relocation of 
slum populations. In order to encourage their participation in the VSB, the government 
offers them public land at a lower price than the market price. In exchange, the companies 
must then offer the slum-dwellers cheap social housing that they can afford (ONDH 2015: 
20, Bogaert 2018: 214, 215). Related to these are microcredit institutions. Although they 
have a limited access to resources and have therefore seen their role constrained, since 
2004 they are allowed to distribute credits worth up to 30,000 dirhams for the purchase 
or upgrading of housing (Banque Mondiale 2006: 26). Thus, they are meant to work as a 
support mechanism for real estate developers and public agencies.  
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Finally, slum-dwellers are the very reason for the existence of the Cities Without Slums 
programme. They are one of the most excluded social groups in the country. This social 
marginalization comes from a strong stigmatisation and a wide perception that they are a 
threat to security and public health. In spite of these perceptions, they are a heterogeneous 
population with different social and economic characteristics (Banque Mondiale 2006: 
28, 30). These residents live in slums for very different reasons, and this is something that 
the VSB tends to ignore. Instead, the programme applies technical strategies of relocation 
to very subjective issues in a way that threatens the agency of the affected populations 
(Beier and Strava 2020: 18).  
 
Is there any social and financial support for relocated populations? 
The Cities Without Slums programme incorporates certain instruments that theoretically 
support the relocation operations and make them more accessible and affordable to slum-
dwellers. One of these is accompagnement social (AS, social accompaniment in English). 
AS is a technique for encouraging slum-dwellers’ participation and providing them with 
some social support when moving to a new area. Specifically, AS organizes information 
sessions for slum populations and assists them with administrative and financial issues 
(Bogaert 2018: 218). Although it gives social matters some space, in practice it places 
technical issues above everything else. Hence, the main objective is that relocation takes 
place, and the administrative and financial assistance offered are criticised for being a 
mechanism for speeding up the moving out process (Le Tellier and Guérin 2009: 659).  
In order to assist slum-dwellers financially, the state promoted the work of microcredit 
institutions, as mentioned in the previous section, and created FORAGIM12 in 2004, “a 
                                                          
12 FORAGIM is currently called “Damane Assakane”.  
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guarantee fund for populations with low or irregular income” (ONDH 2015: 28). Through 
FORAGIM, the access to bank credit for slum-dwellers is facilitated because the risk is 
shared between the state and the credit issuer (Le Tellier and Guérin 2009: 672). Between 
2004 and 2014, approximately 40% of the loans granted were destined for households 
located in Casablanca (Bogaert 2018: 218, 219).  
 
Brief criticism of the VSB 
The government defends having improved the living conditions of thousands of former 
slum-dwellers. What is more, UN-Habitat rewarded Morocco with the UN-Habitat Scroll 
of Honour Award in 2010 for having “one of the world’s most successful and 
comprehensive slum reduction and improvement programmes” (Bogaert 2018: 212). As 
this section indicates, the relocation of thousands of people has indeed taken place. This 
has involved the cooperation of different actors, and the state has made available different 
instruments aimed at accelerating the implementation of the programme and the many 
relocation operations that are part of it. 
However, the VSB has received ample criticism as well. Although the next chapters focus 
on the extent to which the programme really serves the needs of the affected populations, 
here it is important to make a point. Critics argue that the programme has in fact 
prioritized the needs of the market (Le Tellier and Guérin 2009: 659). By dealing with 
relocation as a purely technical issue, the state has transformed former slum-dwellers into 
participants of the formal market economy (Zemni and Bogaert 2011: 411). The Cities 
Without Slums is a political as well as an economic project that follows the neoliberal 
logic. It involves the public and the private, and attempts to modify the local in order to 
attract the foreign: real estate development, international trade and investments and 
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tourism. Lefebvre’s theory on the production of space (1991) is a valuable tool for it 
analysis.  
 
The VSB and Lefebvre’ theory on the production of space 
Lefebvre’s (1991) starting point is that space is not a passive locus in the exercise of social 
relations, but a social product that plays an active role in the existing mode of production. 
When analysing the different sets of forms and relations that social space comprises, one 
must also consider the larger context of capitalist development. In the context of this 
work, this means that an analysis of the VSB programme must consider the different 
relations in play throughout the implementation years of the project, in a broader context 
of capitalist production.  
In his analysis, Lefebvre distinguishes three dimensions of social space, namely spatial 
practice, representations of space and representational spaces. First, spatial practice is 
identified with the perceived space. It is the dimension that brings the other two together. 
Second, representations of space refers to the space conceived by urban planners and 
leaders. It is the dominant space dimension in any society or mode of production. In this 
work, it refers to the VSB programme itself, to the geographical changes planned by 
policy-makers and the implementation of the programme. It is this representation that is 
imposed upon the Moroccan population, or in this case, slum-dwellers. Third, 
representational spaces refers to the space of the inhabitants and “users”. It is the lived 
dimension of social space. In the Moroccan case, the representational spaces are the lived 
spatial experiences of all slum dwellers affected by the VSB programme. 
As Brenner and Elden (2009: 368) argue in their analysis of Lefebvre’s theory, spatial 
relations of capitalism cannot be reduced to a fix planning framework. A spatial strategy 
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such as the VSB programme is a powerful instrument that aims at reorganizing socio-
spatial relations, which can be contested as well. Hence, social space is produced with the 
interaction of its three dimensions. It is precisely the uncertain connection between 
representations of space on the one hand, and representational spaces on the other, that 
come together within a spatial practice. The next two chapters deal with each of these 
matters, giving special attention first to representations of space and later to 
representational spaces.  
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Chapter 2- Changing geographies of displacement and poverty concentration in 
Casablanca. 
 
Casablanca’s administrative and territorial division: what role for politics?  
The Casablanca prefecture (henceforth Casablanca) is one of Morocco’s most important 
administrative subdivisions. It is located in the centre-West of Morocco, surrounded by 
the Mohammedia prefecture to the North, the Nouaceur province to the South and the 
Médiouna province to the East. Over the years, Casablanca has experienced several 
changes in its administrative division, the 2016 division being the latest. Prior to 2016, 
these four subdivisions comprised Grand Casablanca, one of the former regions in the 
country. Today, they are part of a bigger area —the Casablanca-Settat region— and 
Casablanca comprises eight préfectures d’arrondissement or districts13.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 The eight districts, very relevant for the analysis in this chapter, are the following: Ain Chock 
(Ain Chock), Hay Hassani (Hay Hassani), Ain Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi (Ain Sebaa, Assoukhour 
Assawda, Hay Mohammadi), Al Fida- Mers Sultan (Al Fida, Mers Sultan), Ben M’Sick (Ben 
M’Sick, Sbata), Casablanca Anfa (Anfa, El Maarif, Sidi Belyout), Moulay Rachid (Moulay 
Rachid, Sidi Othmane) and Sidi Bernoussi (Sidi Bernoussi, Sidi Moumen). The names in brackets 
are the quarters within each district. (Direction Régional de Casablanca-Settat 2018a).  
Figure 1. The Casablanca-Settat region. Source: Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales, 2015. 
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The division into regions and provinces changes occasionally as the high rates of 
population growth lower the control of the state over the population. Thus, 
decentralization and the creation of administrative subdivisions become a way for the 
Ministry of Interior to keep political control over citizens (McMurray 2014: 23) and bring 
the “administration closer to those administered” (Bogaert 2018: 187). In the Casablanca 
context, this is something to bear in mind, because, following Lefebvre’s theory on the 
production of space, they are the representations of space that dominate society (Lefebvre 
1991: 38). Perhaps the most important development was the establishment of the wilaya 
of Casablanca, which became “the highest authority at the subnational level in Morocco” 
(Bogaert 2018: 187).  
From all the territory that comprises the Casablanca-Settat region, the Casablanca 
prefecture is the most highly urbanised area. Its surface takes up only 1.1% of the region. 
In spite of this, it includes 49% of the region’s total population (Direction Régionale de 
Casablanca-Settat 2018b: 16). This shows an imbalance in both population and economic 
activity rates, one that made big cities experience faster rates of urbanization (Direction 
Générale des Collectivités Locales 2015: 35), which eventually led to the proliferation of 
slums. In 2004, there were more than half a million slum dwellers spread across more 
than 111,000 households in the then Grand Casablanca territory. This means that there 
were around 500 slums, of which two thirds were only in the city of Casablanca 
(CREADH 2018: 28). According to the Moroccan state, the proliferation of slums and 
other forms of informal housing in Casablanca produced a disruption of the urban space 
that damaged its functioning (ONDH 2015: 47). For that reason, among others, the state 
launched the Cities Without Slums programme in 2004.  
The aim of this chapter is to outline some of the most important projects of upgrading, 
resettlement and rehousing that have taken place within the framework of the Cities 
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Without Slums programme. Covering all of them is beyond the scope of this work, so it 
focuses on some of them and tries to find patterns that are useful for studying 
displacement in the region. In what follows, I map the changing geographies of 
displacement due to slum eradication in Casablanca since the implementation of the 
programme, with a special focus on the Sidi Bernoussi, Ain Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi and 
Casablanca Anfa prefectures, home to Casablanca’s oldest and biggest slums.  
 
Soft displacement vs. hard displacement: mapping the changing geographies under the 
VSB programme.  
Within the scope of the Cities Without Slums programme, territorial governance is 
represented by a combination of public and private actors, comprised by the state and its 
regional and local representatives, on the one hand, and by real estate developers, on the 
other. Together, they have shaped the urban landscape of Casablanca over the years, 
“producing goods and services for the common good” (CREADH 2018: 50). Since the 
implementation of the programme, this production of goods and services has meant the 
increasing production of social housing. Between 2002 and 2007, 89 construction 
Figure 2. The Casablanca prefecture. Source: ViaMichelin.fr 
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agreements were signed by public and private actors for the production of social housing 
in Morocco. And yet, between 2008 and 2014, the number of agreements peaked to 736, 
with more than half of the new housing concentrating in three areas, one of them being 
Casablanca (ONDH 2015: 10). 
This acceleration of social housing construction targeting former slum-dwellers points to 
an increasing displacement due to slum clearance. It is important to remember that, in 
Casablanca, slums are sub-quarters, small self-contained spaces within the different 
districts or prefectures of arrondissement. But before turning to the displacement analysis 
in the different districts, it is important to acknowledge that such analysis is based on a 
wide variety of sources, most of them coming from Moroccan public media. With this, I 
want to emphasise that the following analysis does not take every piece of information at 
face value. Some sources are closer to the Moroccan government than others, and each 
newspaper has its own agenda. For this reason, whenever possible, the information about 
displacement patterns has been contrasted with other media sources. The purpose of this 
analysis is not to analyse media discourses or to assess media reliability, but to find 
patterns that point to a specific governmental strategy towards slums. Taking this into 
account, and the Cities Without Slums program as the starting point, how have the 
geographies of displacement changed in Casablanca since 2004? 
 
Prefecture of arrondissements of Sidi Bernoussi 
Sidi Bernoussi is located in north-eastern Casablanca, in the periphery of the city. It is 
composed by the arrondissements of Sidi Bernoussi and Sidi Moumen, home to some of 
the biggest and oldest slums in the country (MAP and Le Matin 2007), stigmatised for 
being the place of origin of the people who committed the suicide attacks of 2003 
31 
 
(Bogaert 2011: 721). In addition, it is the location of one of the most important industrial 
zones of the region (Jafry 2007a), and originally, it was designed by French planners as 
a satellite town for Casablanca (Sebti 2013: 52).  
 
This prefecture is a good example for illustrating that different slum management tactics 
existed before 2004, and that the VSB meant the acceleration of an already existing 
process, not the creation of a new one. For instance, Moroccan media discussed two 
rehousing operations called “Al Yakine” and “Al Mabrouka”. These were launched in 
May 2003 and built 2,113 social housing apartments in Sidi Moumen, relocating slum 
dwellers from the same area (L’Economiste 2003a).  
With the implementation of the VSB, this process accelerated. The national press has 
illustrated this with several examples. For instance, in October 2006, the Molay Hachim 
slum in Sidi Moumen was demolished and its population signed a transfer agreement to 
the Anassi quarter, which is also in Sidi Moumen but more towards the periphery of 
Figure 3. Prefecture of arrondissements of Sidi Bernoussi. Source: Google Maps. Edited by the author. 
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Casablanca (L’Economiste 2006). This is what I call “soft displacement”, meaning 
displacement that happens within the same prefecture of arrondissement or across 
arrondissements from Casablanca. It is displacement that happens towards the periphery, 
and the affected populations still have to move to a new place and see their living 
environment disrupted. However, the distance from the original place of residence is not 
that long, and the same administrative rules apply since they are still in the same 
subdivision.  
This is a common pattern found in the area. Other press articles mentioned, among others, 
a construction agreement signed in December 2007 for the development of the 
arrondissement of Sidi Moumen, according to which a new urban centre called “Assalam” 
would be created. Again, Assalam is located in Sidi Moumen, but more towards the 
perimeter (MAP and Le Matin 2007). At the same time, there are instances of 
displacement within the same prefecture that do not show a clear movement towards the 
periphery, and sometimes displacement even happens across arrondissements. The first 
is the case of operation “Ikamat Al Boustane” a rehousing project launched in April 2007 
targeting 300 families from Douar Peugeot and Ghrib, in the heart of Sidi Moumen (Jafry 
2007b, Le Matin 2007a). The second is the case of project “Al Amane” for the 
resettlement and rehousing of 13,712 households from the Sidi Moumen slums, mainly 
Douar Sekouila, Douar Thomas, Rhamna and Zaraba (Jafry 2010). Al-Amane is located 
in the perimeter of Ain Sebaa, but it is close to Sidi Moumen.  
Douar Sekouila and Douar Thomas have attracted special attention in the media over the 
years. The case of Douar Sekouila illustrates again how similar slum measures were 
implemented prior to the launch of the VSB programme. In September 2003, a housing 
programme called “Ahl Loghlam” was revived. Through a public-private partnership, it 
has made several rehousing units available for slum dwellers from Sekouila 
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(L’Economiste 2003b). Ahl Loghlam is located in Sidi Moumen, so no displacement 
towards the periphery took place here either. Since 2004, Sekouila has undergone several 
operations. In June 2005, the state launched resettlement operation “Salam 1” (Haimoud 
2005), targeting 6,373 families (Aujourd’hui le Maroc 2007). As mentioned above, “Al 
Amane” also received a part of the former slum dwellers from Sekouila (Le Matin 2009a). 
In February 2013, the last shacks were demolished (MAP and Aujourd’hui le Maroc 
2013), although it was not until January 2014 that the last inhabitants were relocated to 
the new sites (El Affas 2014). All this happened within the area of Sidi Moumen. The 
case of Douar Thomas is very similar. In June 2005, the state launched rehousing 
operation “Salam 2” (Haimoud 2005, Aujourd’hui Le Maroc 2007). In the following 
years, slum dwellers from Douar Thomas were also rehoused in the “Al Amane” project 
(Le Matin 2009a). By early 2014, the rate of relocation completion was 96% (El Affas 
2014).  
This does not mean that there has not been any displacement outside Casablanca. For 
instance, in March 2015 the state launched operation “Riad”, located in the Médiouna 
province, the second part of which entailed the resettlement of 650 households from El 
Menzeh, Bouaâzza Ben Taïbi and Boulahya, slums located in the arrondissement of Sidi 
Bernoussi (A.E. 2015). In spite of this, there is a clear predominance of displacement 
within the Casablanca prefecture, or what I have called soft displacement.  
 
Prefecture of arrondissements of Ain Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi 
Ain Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi is located in north-eastern Casablanca, but more towards 
the centre of the city. It comprises the arrondissements of Ain Sebaa, Assoukhour 
Assawda and Hay Mohammadi. The latter has a particularly rich history. Hay 
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Mohammadi is a popular working-class industrial and residential quarter. It was home to 
Carrières Centrales, the oldest slum in the country (Beier and Strava 2020: 4). 
 
The inhabitants of Hay Mohammadi started the resistance movement against French 
occupation during the protectorate years. Thus, it is an arrondissement with a strong social 
and political identity, whose popularity dates back to the colonial period (Belarbi 2015: 
140). Today, it still has a very high concentration of slums. Actually, the media reported 
that half the slum population of Casablanca was located here in 2004 (L’Economiste 
2004). For that reason, the prefecture committed to the Cities Without Slums programme, 
and already in 2004 expressed its will to eradicate, among others, Douar Bouih, Lakrimat, 
Sidi Abdellah Belhhaj, Kabla and Carrières Centrales.  
Throughout the years, different operations and projects have been implemented. For 
instance, in 2013, La Vie Éco reported that multiple families coming from Kariane 
Sahrawa, Douar Casa, Qamra, Nhaïliya, Larbi Fadli and Hay Adil had been relocated to 
Figure 4. Prefecture of arrondissements of Ain Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi. Source: Google Maps. Edited by the author. 
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social housing apartments to the perimeter of Ain Sebaa, to the quarters of Al-Amane and 
El Wifaq (Houdaifa 2013). This is an example of displacement within the prefecture, but 
with a clear component of relocation towards the periphery. More recently, in September 
2018, resettlement project “Riad” was implemented in Douar Louassti, where 752 shacks 
were demolished. Consequently, 976 families were relocated to the Médiouna province, 
the site where this project has been developed (MAP and Le Matin 2018). This is what I 
call “hard displacement”, meaning not only displacement towards the periphery, but also 
displacement outside Casablanca.  It is the displacement that takes place when former 
slum dwellers from Casablanca are relocated to Médiouna, Nouaceur or Mohammedia, 
the surrounding provinces and prefectures.  
A concentration that deserves special attention and that has been very present in 
Moroccan media is Carrières Centrales (Hay Mohammadi), the oldest slum in Morocco. 
In 2003, before the launch of the VSB, this slum experienced the revival of operation Ahl 
Loghlam along with Douar Sekouila, in Sidi Moumen (L’Economiste 2003b). This meant 
displacement towards the periphery, specifically towards the prefecture of Sidi Bernoussi, 
or soft displacement. In spite of initial relocation programs, by 2004, Carrières Centrales 
was comprised of 15,000 shacks (L’Economiste 2004). 
In late 2007, the decision was made to eradicate the Carrières. Reported by journalists 
(Eddine Herradi 2007a) and scholars (Beier 2019b: 2) alike, the idea was that an important 
part of its population, around 30,000 people, were relocated to social housing apartments 
in the town of Lahraouiyine14, in the Médiouna province. This decision caught the 
attention of most national media, given the popularity and history of the slum. Thus, 
                                                          
14 Lahraouiyine was part of a bigger project of peripheral urban centres designed for the relocation 
of slum dwellers coming from Casablanca. This is what Rousseau and Harroud (2019) have called 
“satellite cities”. Tit Mellil and Lhalhal are further examples of satellite cities.  
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different sources with their different political inclinations observed its demolition 
process. The objective was to transform the free space after eradication into a green space, 
as part of a broader project of urban transformation of Casablanca (Le Matin 2010a). By 
the end of 2011, around 80% of Carrières Centrales had been demolished (Aujourd’hui 
le Maroc 2011), a situation that prolonged until mid-2014 (El Affas 2014), when new 
projects were launched.  
In June 2014, a new rehousing operation was approved, which entailed the transfer of 
more slum dwellers to the Tit Mellil town, in the Médiouna province (Le Matin 2014a). 
In October that same year, 600 families were relocated to Lahraouiyine and the Lhalhal 
region, close to Lahraouiyine and also in Médiouna (Le Matin 2014b). This meant that 
by early 2015, 90% of the Carrières Centrales population had been displaced. In March 
2015, the state approved the rehousing operation “Al Hamd” and the second phase of the 
resettlement operation “Riad”, both in Médiouna, which entailed the transfer of 414 
households from Hay Mohammadi (A.E. 2015). The following year, the last residents of 
Carrières Centrales, who comprised 48 households, were evicted by force, according to 
both Moroccan media (Hamza Hachlaf 2016) and political geographer Raffael Beier 
(2019b: 9). The shacks were demolished and the Carrières ceased to exist. Since mid-
2019, the second tramway line of Casablanca functions on its ruins. This was indeed not 
the very reason behind the demolition of the slum, but it accelerated the process since it 
increased pressure on the local government to free the space (Beier 2019b: 2, 10).  
As these developments show, the former residents of Carrières Centrales were subject to 
many instances of hard displacement since 2007. Contrary to slum dwellers in the Sidi 
Bernoussi prefecture, who were mostly relocated within Casablanca, the inhabitants of 
Carrières Centrales were pushed to the Médiouna province. This shows a different pattern 
of displacement, one particular to the Ain Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi prefecture.  
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Prefecture of arrondissements of Casablanca Anfa 
Casablanca Anfa, usually called Anfa, is located on the beachfront, in the centre of the 
city. It is comprised by the arrondissements of Anfa, El Maarif and Sidi Belyout. This 
prefecture has a very rich history as well. Actually, Anfa was Casablanca’s original name, 
long before the French protectorate in the early 20th century. Until the 19th century, it was 
a small fishing town (Abu-Lughod 1980: 96). Today, it is one of Casablanca’s most 
luxurious and modern districts, in addition to its financial hub. However, it also has a high 
concentration of slums. In 2014, ten years after the beginning of the Cities Without Slums 
program, it was the arrondissement with the highest percentage of slums (22.6%) in 
Casablanca (HCP 2014).  
 
 
In January 2005, the state approved a partly upgrading, party resettlement operation 
involving Douar Sidi Massaoudi, according to which 347 households were upgraded and 
provided with potable water, electricity and sanitation facilities, among others. Slum 
Figure 5. Prefecture of arrondissements of Casablanca Anfa. Source: Google Maps. Edited by the author. 
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upgrading minimizes displacement, but it does not completely avoid it. Consequently, 
114 families were resettled and their houses demolished (L’Economiste 2005). Bachkou, 
one of Anfa’s famous slums, located in El Maarif, was another site of unsanitary 
environment. Over the years, the media reported unsuccessful attempts by the local 
authorities to get rid of it. At the end, the last shacks were demolished in 2012 (Mountassir 
2012). By 2013, Bachkou, which was home to almost 2,000 households, no longer was 
(El Affas 2013).  
In November 2014, Le Matin (2014c) gave voice to a public announcement about a new 
rehousing operation for the residents of Ârsat Lhaj M’barek, according to which they 
would receive social housing apartments in Lahraouiyine, Médiouna province. Due to 
different administrative issues the demolition was delayed, but by late 2015, 450 families 
out of a total of 500 had already been relocated (Le Matin 2015). This is again an 
illustration of hard displacement, an operation of relocation towards the periphery that 
drove residents out of the centre of Casablanca to the Médiona province. According to a 
journalist working for La Vie Éco, by 2016, Anfa still had 36 slums and was home to 
5,600 households (Trari 2016). However, displacement operations continued, and in 
March that same year, several conventions involving the different slums in the area were 
signed for their residents to be resettled somewhere else and the shacks demolished. This 
resulted in further displacement outside Casablanca, with plans for all slums in Anfa to 
be resettled to the Tit Mellil region (Médiona province) and to Ouled Saleh (Nouaceur 
province).  
These results show a pattern of hard displacement in the Casablanca- Anfa prefecture. 
What is interesting here is that, just like the Ain Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi slums, residents 
were relocated to the same places, mainly to Lahraouiyine and Tit Mellil, both located in 
Médiouna. This illustrates a pattern of internal migration, from the economic centre to 
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the poorer peripheries. Not only Anfa is displacing slum dwellers, but it is also 
transforming its surface in order to attract tourism and investment. An example of this is 
the Ville nouvelle d’Anfa, a project for a new urban centre launched in 2013 with the 
stated objective of creating green spaces, building business, health-care, leisure and 
culture facilities and being home to 100,000 residents, as argued by L’Economiste (El 
Affas 2013). This project, of course, did not include former slum dwellers from the area. 
If that were not enough, Aljem and Strava (2020: 18) show that it also displaced middle-
class residents, a necessary measure to achieve the explicit objective of “social 
exclusivity”.  
 
Prefectures of arrondissements of Al Fida- Mers Sultan, Ben M’Sick and Moulay Rachid 
The three prefectures are analysed together in this subsection because they are located in 
the same area and they follow similar patterns of displacement.  
Figure 6. Prefectures of arrondissements of Al Fida-  Mers Sultan, Ben M'Sick and Moulay Rachid. Source: Google 
Maps. Edited by the author. 
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Al Fida- Mers Sultan is located in the centre of Casablanca. It comprises the 
arrondissements of Al Fida and Mers Sultan. The latter is also a symbol of Moroccan 
resistance to colonialism. A quarter that Europeans used to frequent during the 
protectorate years, it became a symbol of resistance when, in 1955, a group of Moroccans 
perpetuated a bombing attack against Europeans (Benargane 2017). As regards this area, 
probably one of the most important projects launched in the context of the Cities Without 
Slums programme is the rehousing operation “Omar Ibn Al Khattab”, aimed at relocating 
the slum dwellers from the same prefecture (Aujourd’hui le Maroc 2006). Omar Ibn Al 
Khattab, previously called Derb Milan, is located in the centre of Casablanca. It is now 
home, among others, to the former residents of Dar Chama, Arsat Bel Chahib, Kouri 
Hossaine and Kouri Kadour, as reported by Le Matin (2009b). Therefore, this is 
displacement within the same prefecture, but without a clear pattern of relocation towards 
the periphery.  
The Ben M’Sick prefecture is located in the centre-East of Casablanca. It comprises the 
arrondissements of Ben M’Sick and Sbata, in the perimeter. The Ben M’Sick slums have 
a long history. In fact, they date back to the protectorate period, when they were places 
of nationalist movements against the French (Belarbi 2015: 140). Already in the first 
years of the protectorate, displacements of Moroccan populations led to the concentration 
of unsanitary housing in places like Ben M’Sick. By the 1920s-1930s, there was quite a 
concentration of informal housing in the area (Belarbi 2015: 140, La Nouvelle Tribune 
2011). Thus, it is not surprising that the VSB has been present there.   
The upgrading project “Al Wahda” was approved only one year after the launch of the 
VSB programme. This project focused on the restructuration of Hay Farrane Al Halwa, 
located in the Sbata arrondissement. This meant that 670 families benefitted from the 
upgrading project, whereas 1,628 families were relocated to social housing apartments in 
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Sbata (Le Matin 2005). This was again, relocation within the same area, without a pattern 
of displacement towards the periphery. Another example is the “Omar Ibn Al Khattab-4” 
project, the fourth phase of the resettlement and rehousing project, which in 2006 targeted 
slum dwellers from the former Al Idrissia commune, in Ben M’Sick, to be relocated in 
220 social housing apartments in the Al Fida arrondissement (Le Matin 2006a). Ben 
M’Sick and Al Fida are close to each other, and in this case, it can be argued that 
displacement took place towards the centre of Casablanca. In addition to the different 
operations of slum clearance, this prefecture in general, and the periphery of Sbata in 
particular, has seen the creation of green spaces, just like other peripheral areas of 
Casablanca as reported by L’Economiste and other Moroccan press (Ali Jafry 2007c). 
This trend illustrates how slum policies are part of a bigger project of city transformation, 
and not only one of urban poverty eradication. 
Finally, the Moulay Rachid prefecture is located in north-eastern Casablanca, and 
comprises the arrondissements of Moulay Rachid and Sidi Othmane. This is a more recent 
concentration. Actually, it was born from Ben M’Sick’s growth and it took its name from 
King Mohamed VI’s younger brother (La Nouvelle Tribune 2011). It follows the same 
trend than the previous divisions. In addition to the creation of green spaces in the Moulay 
Rachid and Sidi Othmane peripheries (Jafry 2007c), the prefecture has experienced slum 
eradication and displacement projects within its territory. One example is Carrière Sidi 
Othmane, one of the first slum eradication projects under the Cities Without Slums 
programme (Le Matin 2006b). Later on, it experienced the launch of the regional 
development programme for Casablanca, which included the Moulay Rachid 
arrondissement and aimed at resettling slum dwellers from the area through the newly 
launched “Al-Fadl” operation (Al Bayane 2011). Thus, the three prefectures, located in 
the centre-East of Casablanca, have experienced a pattern of within prefecture 
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displacement under the VSB programme. At best, it can be argued that this was soft 
displacement, but without a clear pattern of relocation towards the periphery in some 
cases. 
 
Prefectures of arrondissements of Hay Hassani and Ain Chock. 
Like in the previous subsection, these two prefectures are analysed together because they 
are next to one another and show similar patterns of displacement. Both are located in the 
South of Casablanca, and they comprise the arrondissements of Hay Hassani and Ain 
Chock, respectively. Their history dates back to the protectorate years; they were 
conceived by French architects as satellite cities to Casablanca, and throughout the years 
they have become part of it (Marges et Villes n.d.).  
 
Already prior to the launch of the VSB programme, Moroccan media reported on 
population displacement due to slum demolition happening in the area. For instance, in 
Figure 7. Prefectures of arrondissements of Hay Hassani and Ain Chock. Source: Google Maps. Edited by the author. 
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2002, the state launched a resettlement operation to relocate the residents of Carrière 
Schneider, a famous slum in Hay Hassani. It was supposed to temporarily relocate slum 
dwellers to the area of Sour Jdid, in the centre of Casablanca (Tohry 2002). With the 
launch of the VSB in 2004, a resettlement project was presented, according to which 
residents would be relocated to Ouled Saleh, in the Nouaceur province (Article 19.ma 
2016). More recently, this pattern of displacement towards the periphery has continued 
under a new rehousing operation. In July 2018, the Moroccan newspaper Libération 
(2018) published that 395 families from Douar Ouled Rahou and El Ouzazna Errahma, 
located in the Ennasim and Lissasfa sectors of Hay Hassani, were relocated to a new 
urban centre called “Annasr”, in the Nouaceur province. This is another case of hard 
displacement.  
The Ain Chock prefecture has followed the same steps. One of the slum clearance 
operations carried out in the area and that has been reported on is that of the “Al Izdihar” 
project, aimed at relocating 400 households from Douar Laatour, in the California quarter, 
to Bouskoura, in the Nouaceur province (MAP and Le Matin 2013). This population, who 
was provided with social housing apartments in Nouaceur, is another instance of hard 
displacement. Therefore, both prefectures, located in the Southern periphery of 
Casablanca, have experienced displacement towards the periphery, and, in fact, to a 
different province. 
 
Main findings and remarks 
As this chapter has shown, the Moroccan press has extensively reported on the changing 
locations of former slum-dwellers from Casablanca since the launch of the Cities Without 
Slums Programme. The main finding is that there are indeed different patterns of 
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displacement. However, these patterns are not so much discernible if we take the 
prefecture as a whole. Rather, it is the study of the different prefectures of arrondissement 
separately that helps detect the different trends better.  
By roughly dividing the different subdivisions into Northern, central and Southern15 
areas, I was able to see different patterns. However, these patterns do not correspond to 
central vs. peripheral prefectures (the Northern and Southern areas). On the one hand, the 
Northern prefecture of Sidi Bernoussi showed a clear pattern of displacement towards the 
periphery, but mostly within the prefecture. This is to say, a pattern of soft displacement. 
On the contrary, the Southern prefectures of Hay- Hassani and Ain Chock showed a 
stronger pattern of displacement towards the periphery, one that pushed people out of 
Casablanca to Nouaceur. This is what I have called hard displacement. The other five 
prefectures, those located more at the centre of Casablanca show ambiguous results. On 
the one hand, Ain Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi and Casablanca Anfa have experienced 
patterns of hard displacement towards the Médiouna province while Al Fida-Mers Sultan, 
Moulay Rachid and Ben M’Sick have experienced cases of soft displacement, or again, 
displacement within the prefecture.  
This classification of soft and hard displacement is a good way of analysing movements 
of people because it shows that there are different degrees of displacement. Although 
moving out of their houses has undoubtedly been a change for all former slum-dwellers, 
it is important not to generalize, and to make a case-by-case assessment that helps 
understand what populations have been displaced further. Here it is interesting to recall 
sociologist Navez-Bouchanine’s (2003b: 7) historical explanation about slums: old slums 
                                                          
15 Roughly, the Northern area would be Sidi Bernoussi; the central prefectures would be Ain 
Sebaa- Hay Mohammadi, Al Fida- Mers Sultan, Moulay Rachid, Ben M’Sick and Anfa; and the 
Southern area would be comprised by Hay Hassani and Ain Chock.  
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were peripheral at the time of their creation, but they became integrated within the cities 
as these kept growing over the years. Peripheral slums, on the other hand, were less 
integrated. In the case of soft displacement, this explanation helps to argue that, in spite 
of displacement, residents are still within the prefecture, and for this reason 
marginalization is reduced. On the contrary, hard displacement entails expulsion towards 
the periphery, which, as Navez-Bouchanine argued, increases exclusion. This is the case 
of the slum populations relocated to new urban centres in other provinces. The main point 
is that things are neither black or white, and the distinction between soft and hard 
displacement allows for an analysis of the greys in between.  
The results from this chapter fit in with the data about population growth for the period 
2004-2014. According to an official document published by the Ministry of Interior 
(General Direction of Local Collectivities) in 2015 about the Casablanca-Settat region, 
the provinces that experienced the highest rates of population growth during the indicated 
period were Nouaceur and Médiouna16. Based on the analysis above, I argue that this may 
not only be the case due to natural population growth, but also due to slum eradication 
policies that pushed thousands of people outside Casablanca, to these areas.  
In spite of this displacement, the Cities Without Slums programme has not been entirely 
successful in the region, since Casablanca has not been declared a ville sans bidonvilles 
yet. A further proof of this is that, by 2014, the Anfa, Sidi Moumen and Sidi Bernoussi 
arrondissements still had quite high percentages of slums, as indicated by the last census 
carried out by the Moroccan state17. Still, other important patterns can be extracted from 
this analysis. First, there is a clear predominance of resettlement and rehousing operations 
                                                          
16 From 2004 to 2014, Nouaceur’s population increased by 3.52%, followed by Médiouna with 
3.46%. On the other hand, Casablanca’s growth was more discrete, with 1.31% (Direction 
Générale des Collectivités Locales 2015: 10).  
17 According to the census, in 2014 Anfa had 22.6% of slums, followed by Sidi Moumen and Sidi 
Bernoussi with 15.5% and 11.2% respectively (HCP 2014).  
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under the Cities Without Slums programme, opposite to the upgrading strategy, which 
has only taken place a few times since 2004. This has in fact reinforced displacement, 
since upgrading minimizes the number of people who need to move out. Second, there is 
a perceptible will to clear terrains that can be transformed into green spaces. Third, the 
different patterns of displacement, with the strategy of social housing apartment blocks 
on the one hand, and the remodelling and upgrading of urban spaces in the centre18 on the 
other, have reinforced the homogenization of space (CREADH 2018), or what political 
scientist Isabelle Milbert (2006: 300) has called “an spatial fragmentation that has 
increasingly created homogeneous micro-spaces”.  
This homogenization of the space leads to what Beier (2019b: 5-6) refers to as old vs. 
new peripheries. The older peripheries are specific parts of the city that for some reason 
enjoy greater recognition, and hence these are the populations that are preserved (or kept 
close to their places of origin). Then, the new peripheries are the towns where the 
populations that go through a hard displacement are transferred. They do not enjoy as 
much recognition. Still, how can this ambiguity towards slums be explained? According 
to urban development specialist Lamia Zaki (2013: 39, 40), slum-dwellers have been 
denounced by politicians as a threat to local security, but at the same time they have been 
used as an all-rounder in times of elections, and therefore not always rejected.  
Then why are some slum dwellers kept within the prefecture and others pushed outside? 
This can maybe be explained through Milbert’s (2006: 301) two dimensions of slums: on 
the one hand, its inhabitants, and on the other, a certain space. According to this, the 
ambiguity towards slums can be explained because sometimes policies target the 
populations, and other times they target the space that the authorities want to clear. In my 
                                                          
18 An example of this is the Ville Nouvelle d’Anfa, mentioned in the analysis of this chapter. 
Another example of this is the various luxurious megaprojects that the metropole has developed.  
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work, this could mean that in instances of hard displacement what is really important is 
the space. On the contrary, cases of soft displacement where the slum population is 
transferred somewhere else within the Casablanca prefecture might mean that that 
specific population is, in one way or another, valuable for the public authorities.  
This idea of course needs further research, but it could be a potential explanation as to 
why some populations are more strongly displaced than others. To conclude, this chapter 
has answered the first research question of this work, that the geographies of displacement 
in Casablanca have indeed changed since the implementation of the Cities Without Slums 
programme in 2004. As illustrated above, displacement is always political. Different 
patterns of displacement have been identified, and I hope they will help to better 
understand contemporary urban planning in Morocco. 
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Chapter 3- The subjectivities of displacement and the ambiguous effects of the 
Cities Without Slums programme. 
 
This chapter focuses on the different political and socioeconomic effects of the VSB. As 
mentioned in the first chapter, the slum population is highly heterogeneous. People live 
in slums for different reasons: some seek to build an urban identity, to optimise their 
financial resources… others may not have a choice, a slum might be the only place they 
can afford to live in or maybe they have already been evicted from a different place 
(Banque Mondiale 2006: 28). Whatever their motives, slum-dwellers have seen their 
lifestyles interrupted by a new urban planning strategy for Casablanca, one that prioritises 
the service sector over industry and that increasingly invests on tourism and real estate 
(Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales 2015), as emphasized in the national press 
(Moubsit 2007). This development plan has led to the implementation of the VSB, which 
in turn has led to slum eradication and displacement.  
In response, slum-dwellers have increasingly used a discourse on rights to raise their 
concerns and legitimise their actions. The process of political opening that allowed for 
increasing mobilization in Morocco from the 1990s has also allowed them to transform 
the human rights notion into a slum-dwellers’ rights notion, through which they defend 
their right to live in the city and to decent housing (Essahel 2015: 117, Zaki 2013: 42). 
This discourse has been underlined in the academic and press literatures alike, and it has 
increasingly paved the way for the public manifestation of the positive and negative 
effects of the Cities Without Slums programme.  
 
The change to formal housing and its social effects. 
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The major technical result of the VSB is the transfer of thousands of people from informal 
to formal housing through resettlement and rehousing operations (Ministère de 
l’Aménagement du Territoire National, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de la Politique de 
la Ville n.d.) The change to formal housing is undoubtedly the biggest advantage of the 
VSB programme, which means an improvement in housing conditions. In the Casablanca 
prefecture, the percentage of households equipped with running water has increased from 
87% in 2004 to 93.5% in 2014. Similarly, the percentage of electricity-equipped 
households has increased from 95.9% to 96.9% (Direction Régionale de Casablanca-
Settat 2018b: 93). This increase is due to the increasing clearance of slums and the shift 
towards formal housing. In order to assess the extent of satisfaction or discontent with 
such a change, different studies have been conducted over the years19. According to the 
results, beneficiaries were highly satisfied with their new housing conditions, with a 
majority of them speaking in favour of the new buildings, their internal distribution, 
illumination, ventilation and common areas such as the stairs, corridors and patios. 
Interestingly, beneficiaries showed a lower degree of satisfaction towards the availability 
of public facilities such as schools, green spaces, sport centres, mosques, hospitals and 
shops around the neighbourhood (Direction de la Promotion Immobilière n.d: 146). 
In spite of these housing improvements, a report published in 2018 by a Moroccan 
research centre specialised on human development alerted that stable purchasing power 
and mechanisms of social and territorial integration are fundamental in order to fight 
inequality. Without an affective social and economic policy that linked the housing 
                                                          
19 By 2015, the three main sources of information were three surveys conducted by the 
Observatoire National du Développement Humain in 2010, Holding Al Omrane between 2010 
and 2012, and the Ministry of Housing in collaboration with UN Women in 2014, respectively 
(ONDH 2015: 12).  
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improvements to social integration, the new urban centres would remain spaces of 
poverty and inequality (CREADH 2018: 38).  
In fact, social integration is subject to different perceptions of displacement. On the one 
hand, the press that is politically close to the government highlights an improvement in 
the beneficiaries’ social integration because they are no longer seen as gens des baraques, 
“shacks people” (Le Matin 2006b). According to these publications, former slum-
dwellers see displacement as an opportunity for social upgrade, and sometimes families 
have voluntarily joined resettlement and rehousing projects, even if these entailed hard 
displacement. This was the case of some former slum-dwellers from Hay Hassani, who 
volunteered for a rehousing operation in 2018 although this entailed relocation to 
Nouaceur (Aujourd’hui le Maroc 2018). On the other hand, some people have 
experienced displacement as a metropolitan reject, one that points to a loss of identity and 
social inferiority. This was the case of former slum-dwellers from Casablanca relocated 
to Lahraouiyine, as highlighted by urban sociologist and geographer Wafae Belarbi 
(2015: 141). These varying experiences point to different subjectivities, which have 
previously been shaped by different trajectories both at the personal level, as defended by 
urban planning specialists Beier and Strava (2020: 18) and at the group level. For 
instance, former slum-dwellers from Bachkou, interviewed by La Vie Éco, argued to be 
worse off since displacement because they shared a collective solidarity and identity with 
their former neighbours, which had now been lost (Belouas 2016).  
From a social point of view, a common critique to the VSB is the increasing fragmentation 
and homogenization that it creates. By displacing slum-dwellers, often to the outskirts, 
the city becomes an increasingly homogeneous space of middle and upper classes 
whereas the new urban centres become “ghost cities” populated by lower-income 
populations. Scholars Rousseau and Harroud (2019: 345) studied this. Moreover, the 
51 
 
Moroccan press (Al Bayane 2010a) identified different shortcomings of the VSB, such as 
limitations in accompagnement social (social accompaniment), “a specific methodology 
designed to accompany slum-dwellers through the process of moving to their new 
apartment” (Bogaert 2011: 722). Also, and very importantly, there have been delays in 
the construction and provision of basic facilities and services such as schools, green 
spaces, hospitals, water, electricity etc. that have added to this fragmentation. This 
explains the lower degree of satisfaction that residents have shown in the different surveys 
mentioned above. An example of this is the rehousing operation that was launched to 
relocate former residents from Douar Sekouila. After the slum was demolished, a 
journalist working at Libération found out that residents were notified that their social 
housing apartments had not been equipped with water and electricity, so they had to 
temporarily seek housing elsewhere (Bentaleb 2013).  
Perhaps the element that best illustrates this fragmentation and ambiguity is public 
transportation. In theory, “public transport plays an integrative role by facilitating the 
movement of people and improving access to different goods and services within the city” 
(Beier 2019b: 4). However, in order for public transport to fulfil its duty, there must be 
enough supply and it must reach everyone. Although different bus companies supply 
public transport within the prefecture along with petits and grands taxis, these do not 
operate in the peripheries. There, movement depends on clandestine transport, as pointed 
out by an official report (Direction Régionale de Casablanca-Settat 2018b). This is the 
case of former slum-dwellers from Bachkou relocated to Errahma, in the Nouaceur 
province. Now that they live far away from their workplaces, they must pay extra 
transport expenses which they did not need to pay before because they used to live in the 
centre. These extra expenses are a problem for them because their employers will not 
increase their wages. Moreover, in an interview with La Vie Éco, residents informed 
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against the danger that people get exposed to when depending on this type of transport, 
and argued that young girls are often sexually harassed (Belouas 2016). Therefore, the 
lack of transport in some areas where slum-dwellers have been relocated consolidates 
fragmentation between urban spaces and the homogenization of centre and periphery. It 
reinforces the feeling of isolation and marginalization (ONDH 2015: 58).  
An important development in this context was the creation of two tramway lines across 
Casablanca, inaugurated in 2012 and 2019 respectively20.  The tramway has brought 
slum-dwellers affected by soft displacement closer to the city, since the two lines go 
through some of the districts with high rates of slums. They “see it as a form of reparations 
and argue that it has brought into relief existing social fragmentation” (Strava 2018: 27). 
With this, Strava (2018: 25) refers to the ghettoization and violent repression that slum 
populations suffered under the reign of Hassan II. This shows the ambiguity of 
transportation in Casablanca: for some slum-dwellers, it has been made available, but for 
others it is still a major barrier to integration. 
 
Political contestation and mobilization 
Behind the VSB lies an array of public and private actors. The impact these have had on 
the design and implementation of the programme depend on their political, social and 
financial resources. The actors with the highest influence are located in the centre of 
political power, and this power decreases as geographical distance from the centre 
increases (Banque Mondiale 2006: 27). Yet, the Moroccan population tends to put the 
                                                          
20 The first tramway line crosses Darb Ghellaf, Beauséjour, Casa Finance City, Hay Hassani and 
Ain Diab, and the second line crosses Sidi Bernoussi, Ain Sbaâ, Hay Mohammadi, Derb Sultan, 
El Fida and Anoual (TelQuel and MAP 2019).  
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blame on local authorities, often condemned in the press and accused of being corrupt 
and repressive (Addam 2011).  
Scholars Arendel and Watterberg (2013: 141) have argued that the state has followed an 
“authoritarian” approach with the Cities Without Slums programme. According to them, 
the VSB is a top-down project that prioritises urban planning over the socioeconomic 
needs of the affected populations. It is a state strategy that aims to restructure the city by 
centralizing power and relocating lower-income populations. Moreover, Morocco scholar 
and specialist Koenraad Bogaert (2011: 726) argues that by integrating them into the 
formal housing market they become consumers, which ensures that the state can “define, 
defend and regulate the norms and boundaries for social life”. Thus, citizen participation 
is minimized in line with the authoritarian approach of the programme. An example of 
this is the fact that the social housing programmes sponsored by the state and private real 
estate developers have followed a restorative rather than an anticipative approach 
(CREADH 2018). Rather than preventing the growth of informal housing and urban 
inequalities in the region, the different actors have reacted late to the problem of slums 
and have not taken the affected populations’ opinions into consideration when dealing 
with it.  
In practice, this authoritarian strategy has had mainly two political effects. The first has 
been the reduction of a qualitative problem to a technical and quantitative issue (ONDH 
2015: 37). This is illustrated by the fact that the studies conducted to evaluate the 
implementation of the programme have all had a quantitative nature, as the surveys 
mentioned in the previous section show. By solely allocating numbers and percentages to 
questions already designed to express a positive feeling towards relocation, the 
programme has failed to provide with valuable qualitative information that reports about 
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the political and socioeconomic effects that the VSB has had on the daily experiences of 
former slum-dwellers. 
The second effect has been the increasing use of slum-dwellers by local authorities as 
electoral all-rounders. In fact, this strategy is not new and it has been used in Morocco 
since before the existence of the VSB, as expressed by L’Economiste (Rboub and Bentak 
2002). However, the VSB and the displacement it has entailed have had an effect on those 
interested in keeping the status quo, such as the local authorities that found their “voter 
markets” in slum residents and that are now losing them due to the population transfers. 
In some cases, such as Carrières Centrales in Hay Mohammadi, these actors have even 
demonstrated against the VSB-led displacement in the name of slum-dwellers (Eddine 
Herradi 2007b). In 2010, an elected representative from Hay Mohammadi was fired for 
inciting slum-dwellers from Carrières Centrales to stay there (Al Bayane 2010b). This, 
by the way, is an illustration of how the Moroccan press tends to put the blame on local 
authorities, instead of on the king or the central government.  
In response to this technical and top-down approach, slum-dwellers have mobilized in 
demonstrations and sit-ins over the implementation years of the VSB. The reasons for 
these mobilizations are varied. Many times, they are not against the VSB itself, but against 
its procedures and specific mechanisms of implementation. Actually, prior to relocation, 
slum-dwellers seem to value the transfer to formal housing more than the displacement 
and isolation they suffer afterwards. 
For this reason, demonstrations and protests are very often against irregularities such as 
delays in the allocation of land plots or social housing apartments, or against the exclusion 
from the program itself. In some instances, the media has reported that parts of slums 
have been demolished without giving families any land plot or apartment in return, which 
has left them living in the streets (La Nouvelle Tribune 2015). This was the case of more 
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than a hundred families from Carrières Centrales who were denied housing in 
Lahraouiyine (Libération 2011) and of another hundred families from Ben M’Sick who 
were excluded from a relocation operation due to census issues (Le Matin 2013). In fact, 
the latter has been a common irregularity in the VSB. Usually, those adults who were 
already married by the time the last census was conducted have received a land plot or an 
apartment with the VSB. However, those people who lived with their parents at the time 
have not counted as VSB beneficiaries and therefore must continue living with them. This 
affects widows and divorced women as well, also left out of the programme (Le Matin 
2013). In other cases, such as the relocation operation for Douar Sekouila, many people 
were excluded from the operation just because they were not present when the census was 
conducted (Bentaleb 2013).  
Important here is the sentiment of injustice that many former slum-dwellers had. For 
instance, in Sidi Moumen older residents complained in interviews with different 
journalists about how newer residents had already received land plots while they were 
still waiting to hear from the authorities (Le Matin 2010b). In Hay Mohammadi, residents 
claimed the injustice of having to share an apartment with the neighbours, instead of 
having one for each family (Le Matin 2010c). Whatever the claim, the people who have 
participated in demonstrations and sit-ins in Casablanca share the unanimous wish to be 
heard and taken into account (Addam 2011). The Cities Without Slums programme and 
the Arab Uprisings of 2011 were a clear incentive for the public manifestation of 
discontent. In fact, since 2011 there has been a multiplication and change of scale of social 
and political mobilisations in Morocco, of which slum-dwellers have undoubtedly been a 
part (Zaki 2013: 49, 50).  
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Economic difficulties after displacement 
If prior to displacement beneficiaries complained about irregularities or delays in 
relocation, after displacement they started to face financial difficulties directly related to 
the VSB system. Already when the VSB was launched in 2004, national newspapers 
alerted that the implication of banks and credit institutions would be necessary in order 
for former slum-dwellers to be able to pay their mortgages (Aujourd’hui le Maroc 2004). 
L’Economiste explains that, in Sidi Moumen, for instance, social housing apartments that 
would normally cost 200,000 dirhams would be sold at 100,000 dirhams. The state would 
subsidize up to 40,000 dirhams, and beneficiaries would be requested to advance the first 
28,000 dirhams. The rest would be paid in monthly instalments of 500 or 600 dirhams 
(Jafry 2007b). 
In fact, the subsidies provided by the state through the Fonds Solidarité Habitat et 
Intégration Urbaine more than doubled with the launch of the VSB in 2004. Between 
2004 and 2016, the credits remained higher than before 2004, although they dropped in 
some years21 (Direction de la Promotion Immobilière n.d.). A journalist working at La 
Vie Éco pointed to another irregularity: no studies were conducted in order to assess 
whether slum families would be able to pay for all the extra bills that moving to formal 
housing entailed (Houdaifa 2013).  
Thus, one of the main economic effects that the VSB had on many of them was the 
inability to pay for the mortgage and extra bills. This was the case for former slum-
dwellers from Ain Sebaa and Bachkou, among others. In Ain Sebaa, slum-dwellers had 
to pay 75,000 dirhams for each apartment. In an interview, they claimed that many people 
                                                          
21 Although the state increased the credits it issued for the fight against unsanitary housing from 
2004, in the years 2007, 2013 and 2016 these dropped, which could have affected slum-dwellers 
that were being relocated at those times (Direction de la Promotion Immobilière n.d).  
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living there were unemployed or already retired and therefore it would be impossible for 
them to afford such a price (Le Matin 2007b). Here, the monthly instalments costed 750 
dirhams, to be paid in 25 years. In an interview conducted in 2013 to the president of a 
local association, the interviewee argued that more than a hundred families could no 
longer pay for their apartments, and consequently, they had been threatened with eviction 
(Houdaifa 2013). Very similar was the situation of former slum-dwellers from Bachkou, 
now relocated to Errahma. Residents argued that they were unable to pay for the water 
and electricity bills, and to pay back the banking credits. They claimed that life for them 
was more precarious since displacement, and regretted having abandoned the slum 
(Belouas 2016).  
These financial issues show that, even though in many cases former slum families were 
happy to join resettlement and rehousing operations at the beginning, they have come to 
realise that their lives have not become any easier after displacement. In other cases, 
people did not want to leave their homes in the first place and therefore sought different 
ways to bypass the programme (Milbert 2006: 305). Initially, some families came up with 
the ideas of renting or selling their new apartments in order to win some extra money. In 
order cases, they ceded their shacks to their parents or other relatives or friends (Le Matin 
2014a). 
However, this did not materialize because, in order for slum-dwellers to get the keys for 
their new apartments, they first had to demolish their own homes. This was supervised 
by local authorities and project managers who made sure that the operation did not stop. 
This was the case, for instance, in Al Fida- Mers Sultan, whose slum-dwellers were 
transferred under the Omar Ibnou Al Khattab project. The objective was to make sure that 
neither residents would go back to the slum nor that they would rent or sell the 
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infrastructure to someone else (Le Matin 2009b). For this reason, it is common to see 
images of slum-dwellers opposing demolition of their barracks in the press.  
In addition to the specific economic difficulties mentioned above, it is important to 
consider the bigger picture, and the differences between cases of soft and hard 
displacement. Although slum-dwellers involved in operations of soft displacement have 
faced economic issues regarding mortgage and bill payments, some might have escaped 
the extra transportation costs. However, those involved in operations of hard 
displacement who have kept their jobs in the city will very likely have also faced extra 
transportation costs. To this, it is important to add that the economic situation is not the 
same everywhere. Casablanca is the economic metropole and financial hub of the country, 
but those who have been displaced to other provinces or prefectures have been displaced 
to areas of higher poverty and vulnerability. According to an official report published in 
2018, Médiouna and Nouaceur have higher rates of poverty and economic vulnerability 
than Casablanca (Direction Régionale de Casablanca-Settat 2018b). This points to a 
deliberate action of displacing vulnerable populations to vulnerable peripheries instead 
of keeping them in the city, which has higher economic prospects.  
 
Main findings and remarks 
As this chapter has shown, the political and socioeconomic effects of the Cities Without 
Slums programme are at best ambiguous. Although prior to displacement, many slum-
dwellers from different neighbourhoods in Casablanca were hopeful that a better future 
would start with a resettlement or rehousing operation, after displacement their feelings 
seem to have changed. This has been especially the case for the beneficiaries of hard 
displacement operations, who, in addition to water and electricity bills, now must pay for 
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extra transportation costs in an unsafe environment that reinforces the feeling of isolation. 
Moreover, beneficiaries of both soft and hard displacement operations are now having 
trouble paying back credits and mortgages. Thus, although the change to formal housing 
and the facilities upgrade is undoubtedly an advantage, there are several factors that make 
this programme not so much beneficial for slum-dwellers. 
If the previous chapter focused on Lefebvre’s representations of space, the urban planning 
strategy shaped by the Moroccan state, this chapter has focused more on representational 
spaces, the lived spatial experiences of slum-dwellers involved in the VSB. As previous 
chapters have mentioned, it is the interaction of these spheres that creates the social space, 
which is constantly changing. In the current neoliberal era, these changing spaces and 
experiences are shaped by a broader political and economic project that seeks the 
integration of informal housing inhabitants into the state’s sphere of influence through 
integration into the market.  
Here it is important to emphasize once again the nature of the sources under analysis. 
During the research for this chapter, official document sources were more lenient and 
tended to emphasize the positive aspects of the programme, such as the beneficiaries’ 
high levels of satisfaction as regards the transfer to formal housing. On the other hand, 
press articles tended to be more critical and emphasized the ambiguous impact of the 
programme. Although the credibility of these sources cannot be taken for granted, they 
have pointed out important aspects that need to be improved. The main conclusion from 
this analysis supports Beier and Strava’s (2020) point that displacement is subjective and 
that it is experienced in different ways by different people. This is to say, there are 
multiple subjectivities. For this reason, it is crucial that programme managers and state 
officials start listening to what the population has to say. A positive aspect of the 
programme is that it has triggered multiple forms of community mobilization (Toutain 
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and Rachmuhl 2013: 105), such as demonstrations and sit-ins. This shows the existing 
potential for the emergence of a “more organised civil society” in Morocco, as argued by 
urban geographer Hicham Mouloudi (2010: 230). In conclusion, standard approaches 
based on one-size-fits-all solutions leave important elements out of the analysis and risk 
ignoring the different contexts that shape the lives of the affected populations (Banque 
Mondiale 2006: 119). 
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Conclusion 
 
Main findings and observations. 
Morocco was indeed a laboratory of urban planning during the protectorate years 
(Rabinow 1989: 32). Colonial ideas such as the duality of the city and its division between 
villes nouvelles and ancienne médina were exploited from 1912 (Abu-Lughod 1980: 150) 
and paved the way for the consolidation of spatial fragmentation once Morocco gained 
independence in 1956. Throughout these years, cities like Casablanca expanded towards 
the periphery and saw the proliferation of different forms of informal housing such as 
slums (Abu-Lughod 1980: 225). In response, operations of slum upgrading, resettlement 
and rehousing were already carried out. A crucial point in time was the neoliberal reform 
of the 1980s, which accelerated from the 2000s. By privatizing and liberalizing the 
economy but failing to address the root causes of urban poverty, neoliberalism 
exacerbated uneven development to the detriment of the more vulnerable (Davis 2006) 
and reorganized state power at the urban scale (Bogaert 2012: 256).  
Urban planning became especially important for the Moroccan regime with the accession 
of King Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999. In 2004, he launched the Cities Without 
Slums programme, a top-down project of slum eradication and population displacement 
at the national level. Today, 59 cities have been declared “cities without slums” in the 
country, which has entailed the displacement of 277,583 households (Ministre de 
l’Aménagement du Territoire National, de l’Urbanisme, de l’Habitat et de la Politique de 
la Ville n.d.). This programme is an example of what Lefebvre (1991) calls 
“representations of space”, meaning the alterations in space that state authorities and 
private actors have carried out in order to reshape spatial relations.  
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Casablanca still has slums. Yet, it has gone through multiple operations of resettlement 
and rehousing under the VSB, part of the representations of space just mentioned. This 
work has shown that the geographies of displacement in Casablanca have indeed changed 
since 2004. This is the main contribution of this work. Specifically, I have distinguished 
between soft and hard displacement to differentiate trends of displacement. In some cases, 
slum-dwellers have been displaced either within the same prefecture of arrondissement 
where the slum used to be or to a different prefecture of arrondissement but still within 
Casablanca. This is what I have called “soft displacement”, a short-distance displacement 
that does not entail a change of province or prefecture. In other cases, slum-dwellers have 
been displaced outside Casablanca, either to the Médiouna province or to the Noaceur 
province. This is what I have called “hard displacement”, a long-distance displacement 
that, in addition to a lifestyle disruption, has meant the transfer to a different 
administrative subdivision. 
Moreover, I have shown that the political and socioeconomic effects of displacement 
under the VSB are at best ambiguous. Although the programme’s main technical 
objective —the transfer of informal housing residents to formal housing— has been 
accomplished with the operations of resettlement and rehousing, many other complex 
effects have derived from this relocation. Among these are bill payments associated to 
the change to formal housing, like water or electricity, extra transportation costs and other 
financial issues like inability to pay back banking credits or mortgages. One positive 
effect from the programme is that the various irregularities have ignited population 
mobilizations, mainly in the form of demonstrations and sit-ins. This shows that polemic 
programmes have the potential for the emergence of a more organised Moroccan civil 
society (Mouloudi 2010: 230), which can pave the way for more democratic processes in 
the future.  
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When it comes to social and community perceptions of displacement, the programme has 
proven to be highly ambiguous. On the one hand, some former slum-dwellers have shown 
their satisfaction with the change to formal housing because it means they are no longer 
seem as shacks people, a term used with a highly pejorative meaning. Thus, they see a 
promising future with higher social recognition and acceptance. On the other hand, other 
former slum-dwellers have expressed their frustration. They argue that, after 
displacement, the feeling of isolation and marginalization has increased, and that 
previously enjoyed collective solidarities and identities have now been lost. Thus, this 
research confirms that there are indeed multiple subjectivities (Beier and Strava 2020) 
and that perceptions of displacement highly depend on personal trajectories. For this 
reason, it is necessary to avoid standard, one-size-fits-all solutions that ignore the specific 
context and reality of the affected population at hand (Banque Mondiale 2006).  
 
Lessons learnt 
One of the main lessons learnt from this research is not to generalise when studying 
displacement, in this case, in Casablanca. As chapter 2 showed, not everyone was 
displaced to the periphery or to a different province. The main effects from displacement 
differ depending on whether someone experienced soft or hard displacement. For 
instance, in the case of beneficiaries of soft displacement operations, it seems that the 
change to formal housing has had a higher impact than displacement itself. However, in 
the case of beneficiaries of hard displacement operations, it is very likely that both the 
change to formal housing and displacement have had a strong impact. This is very likely 
the case because, in addition to the new bills and payments that former slum-dwellers 
now have to make, there are extra transportation costs and social feelings of metropolitan 
reject that beneficiaries of soft displacement are less likely to suffer from. In spite of 
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having been relocated to a new environment and having to pay extra costs, these residents 
still live in the prefecture and thus are closer to their original social and spatial 
environment.  
Thus, social space and practice as understood by Lefebvre is a combination of both the 
technical changes made by the programme and the subjective perceptions and daily 
experiences of slum-dwellers. The main lesson to be learnt from this is that development 
is not only a technical but also a social matter, and that, in order to be successful, 
development strategies must not only come from above, but also from below.  
On a different note, it is important to once again emphasize the nature of the sources used 
in this work. Having to rely on media sources, in an authoritarian country with limited 
freedom of press, presents certain limitations. The information obtained cannot be taken 
at face value, and this means that an extra effort has to be made in contrasting the facts 
whenever possible. In order to overcome this limitation, and especially when dealing with 
subjective information and population perceptions like chapter 3 does, a good idea is to 
resort to academic literature that is based on fieldwork and interviews. This way, it may 
be easier to obtain first hand, accurate information.  
 
Questions for further research 
Although this work has shed light on the displacement dynamics of the VSB in 
Casablanca and its subsequent ambiguous effects, further research will be necessary in 
order to clarify why slum-dwellers from certain prefectures of arrondissement experience 
soft displacement whereas slum-dwellers from other prefectures of arrondissement 
experience hard displacement. As chapter 2 showed, a trend was perceived at the district 
level. Does this have anything to do with slum-dwellers being treated as electoral all-
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rounders? Or with specific political objectives that justify the peripheral displacement of 
some slum-dwellers but not others?  
Last but not least, this topic is an excellent opportunity for doing fieldwork research. As 
time goes by and former slum-dwellers build themselves a new life in their new 
neighbourhoods, it would be very valuable to talk to them and see whether their 
perceptions on displacement have changed in the middle term, and if so, how. Moreover, 
it will be interesting to see how the political mobilisation situation evolves in the next 
years, and whether a more organised civil society develops thanks to this. Although the 
VSB started in 2004, it is still in its implementation phase, and for this reason it will be 
necessary to wait a few years in order to find answers to some of the questions that are 
now being posed.  
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